In what follows I will keep using the terms generate and recognize in order to focus on the issues that interest me here, with the proviso of what has just been stated in this note.ĥ By ‘strictly speaking’, I’m referring to standard definitions of automata as being composed of (simplifying somewhat) an input tape, a control mechanism and a set of states (such as initial and final states Aho et al., 1974 Aho, A. 17) talks of the ‘dual view of language’. Lappin (eds) The Handbook of Computational Linguistics and Natural Language Processing, pp. 5) call these two perspectives the ‘generative point of view’ and the ‘recognition point of view’, respectively. Formal Languages and their Relation to Automata, London: Addison-Wesley. Nevertheless, there’s a difference in perspective between employing a grammar and an automata Hopcroft and Ullman ( 1969 Hopcroft, J. In a more neutral vocabulary, then, both grammars and automata specify languages classes that is, both constructs treat the same ‘reality’.
In this sense, each grammar is equivalent to a specific automaton. As is well known, for any language class there is a grammar that generates it and an automaton that recognises it. 36), even though, as I will show below, it is clearly a radical reinterpretation of the CH (and was not even published at the time).Ĥ I am not obviously suggesting that there is a different ‘hierarchy’ of formal languages in terms of automata – such an interpretation would be rather obtuse indeed. , ) which they take to be a ‘current linguistic perspective’ (p. Syntactic Anchors, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. ) appears to allow for non-linguistic thought in a sense that is closer to what I have in mind here.ģ Curiously, C&U state that their description of the formal properties of computational systems is based on chapter 7 of Uriagereka ( 2008 Uriagereka, J. The Architecture of the Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press. On the other hand, Carruthers ( 2007 Carruthers, P. ) doesn’t range over all the phenomena I have listed.
He clearly employs LF for something it was not meant to do – i.e., representing thought instead of different structures of the same string – but, anyhow, this now-defunct linguistic level (Chomsky, 2005 –––––– (2005) ‘Three Factors In Language Design’, Linguistic Inquiry 36(1): 1–22. ,, , ) attempts to circumvent these phenomena by arguing that thought is entertained in terms of LF representations, which are somehow accessible to introspection. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 25: 657– 726. Language, Thought and Consciousness, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. , ) which I will also discuss here.Ģ Carruthers ( 1996 Carruthers, P. This work was partly funded by grants 2009SGR4FI-B200013 from the Catalan Administration.ġ The views defended in these publications are partly based on chapter 7 of Uriagereka ( 2008 Uriagereka, J. García-Albea and Mario Santos-Sousa for comments on a previous version of this paper. I would like to thank Mark Brenchley, José E.
0 kommentar(er)
